Penn State International Law Review
Volume 26
Number 3 Penn State International Law Review

Article 10

1-1-2008

Corporate Corruption in Latin America:
Acceptance, Bribery, Compliance, Denial,
Economics, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Jose Armando Fanjul

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Recommended Citation
Fanjul, Jose Armando (2008) "Corporate Corruption in Latin America: Acceptance, Bribery, Compliance, Denial, Economics, and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 26: No. 3, Article 10.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol26/iss3/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

Corporate Corruption in Latin America:
Acceptance, Bribery, Compliance, Denial,
Economics, and the Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act
Jose Armando Fanjul*
I.

Birth of Corruption

Benjamin Franklin once proclaimed, "No nation was ever ruined by
trade."' Although a characteristic of the time, Franklin's proposition has
succumbed to societal acceptance of bribery as a normal business
practice, the need for corporate compliance programs, and the
overwhelming denial of the ensuing economic problems caused by such
action or inaction. Seeing the rise of corruption by United States-based
corporations, the legislature enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA") in 1977.2 In 1977, the Senate reported that Security and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") investigations "revealed corrupt foreign
payments by over 300 U.S. companies involving hundreds of millions of
dollars.",3 The FCPA memorialized and subsequently denounced certain
activities as illegal while promulgating various criminal and civil
punishments for those convicted of engaging in such action.4
"Corruption is far from being a novelty. Its practice is as ancient as
* Juris Doctorate Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University, expected May 2008; Bachelor of Arts, Loyola University New Orleans,
awarded May 2004. This Comment is dedicated to my sister, Stephanie Fanjul, I hope I
have been a responsible role model and wish you the best in your future academic
endeavors. A special thank you to Nicole Jackson, Harvard Law School 2009, Robert H.
Ford, University of Texas Law 2009, and Brandon Davis, Tulane Law 2005 for all of
their support throughout law school. Finalmente, a mis padres, Clara y Cesar Fanjul, por
todo su apoyo, y por inculcar en mi la importancia de una educaci6n.
1. Benjamin Franklin, Thoughts on Commercial Subjects, in JOHN BARTLETT,
BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 348 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little, Brown, and Co.)
(1980).
2. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), as reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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other social phenomena like prostitution and contraband.",5 As time has
elapsed, so has the meaning of corruption; 6 "in the past corruption had a
wider significance, embracing the entire moral life of mankind."7 "In
1619, corruption was defined as the use of 'monies designed for the
public service for private ends.' This definition is not far from the
supposedly more precise, technical meaning of today which identifies
corruption with the misappropriation of public money for private gain." 8
The instability of Latin American governments and insufficient
judicial enforcement has supported pervasive corrupt economies that
undermine the financial integrity of both government entities and those
participating in economic activities. 9 This Comment addresses the
intersection of the FCPA and Latin American countries. 10 Part II focuses
on the growing international war on corruption. Part III focuses on both
perceived and actual corruption in Latin America. Part IV focuses on the
structure of a good compliance program and the criminal repercussions
of having an ineffective one. Part V describes one corporation's attempts
to meet FCPA requirements and the hardships it faces, while Part VI
suggests how a corporation can avoid SEC sanctions and provides a
concise conclusion.
II.

International War on Corruption

A.

The ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct

The FCPA was enacted in 197711 and was subsequently amended in
1988,12 1994,13 and 199814 to clarify the original law and address the

5.

INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN EUROPE AND

LATIN AMERICA 2 (Walter Little & Eduardo Posada-Carb6 eds., St. Martin's Press, Inc.)
(1996).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 61.
10. The FCPA's provisions regarding accounting requirements and issuers of
securities will not be discussed.
11. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 amending the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1, -2, and -3 (2000)).
12. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l, -2, and 78ff(c) (2000)).
13. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l, -2, and -3 (2000)).
14. See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l, -2, and 78ff(c)
(2000)).
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international climate regarding corruption. 5 The Act was originally
passed using Congress's interstate commerce powers as evidenced by the
requirement that the particular violation be committed through the "use
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce."' 6
The FCPA attempted to eliminate bribery 17 and enforce more stringent
accounting' 8 requirements for individuals, 9 corporations, 20 and issuers of
securities. 2 1 The FCPA, as it applies to individuals and corporations,
makes it unlawful to use "any instrumentality of interstate commerce
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of anything of value to"'22 any foreign official in an effort to
influence that official in his or her official capacity, 23 thereby securing an
improper advantage or inducing such official to use his or her influence
with a foreign government. 24
Nevertheless, the legislature carefully crafted an exception for
25
routine governmental action, which is known as the "grease exception.
Thus, the FCPA does "not apply to any facilitating or expediting
payment to a foreign official.., the purpose of which is to expedite or to
secure the performance of routine governmental action by a foreign
official. 26 The provision is extremely useful in Latin America because
it helps corporations navigate the intricacies of unstable governments
while remaining in compliance with the FCPA.2 7 Furthermore,
Congress's careful drafting requires that the payment to government
officials be made toward the facilitation of an already legitimate end,
which ensures that the exception does not swallow the rule.28
For those who might misconstrue the provisions of the FCPA, the
penalties imposed for a willful violation are severe. 29 An individual who
violates the FCPA faces a maximum fine of five3° million dollars,31
15.

See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), as reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,

4101.
16.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2000).

17.

See id.

18.
19.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2000).

20.

See id.

21.
22.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(l)(A) (2000).

23.

See id.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
4108.
29.
30.
31.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(B) (2000).
S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10(1977), as reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2000).
Interview with Individual A, infra note 196.
See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2000).
All monetary sums are in United States dollars unless otherwise specified.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2000).
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imprisonment not lasting more than twenty years, 32 or both. 33 In
contrast, the members of a corporation that is charged are not subject to
imprisonment, but they may be subject to a maximum fine of twenty-five
million dollars.34 Regardless, any corporation, no matter how slightly
connected with allegations of a potential FCPA violation, is likely to
suffer substantial damage to its reputation. 35 Aside from large fines, the
potential public embarrassment a company faces from an FCPA violation
almost mandates that corporations establish effective compliance
programs.
B.

InternationalEfforts Toward Combating Corruption

Efforts aimed at combating corruption are necessary in the
Americas due to the volume of commerce that occurs between these
geographically close nations. One such attempt was the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, 36 where twenty-six Member States of
the Organization of American States ("OAS"), 3 7 twenty of which were
Latin American states, agreed to adhere to several important principles.38
Within the agreement, Member States agreed to make bribery of a
government official an extraditable offense.3 9 In addition, Member
States promised assistance and cooperation with any matters pertinent to
the subject of the treaty.n
Although the United States has been at the forefront of combating
corporate corruption, a unilateral effort toward correcting a multinational
issue seems daunting.4 1 Nevertheless, many nations have joined the
effort as evidenced by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development's ("OECD") Anti-Bribery Convention that was adopted in
1997 by thirty Member States and five other non-Member States, 42 four
32. Id.
33. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 increased criminal penalties under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title XI, § 1106, 116 Stat. 810 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006)).
34. Id.
35. Robert B. Hughes, Legal Compliance Checkups: Business Clients, 1 LEGAL
COMPLIANCE CHECKUPS § 1:15 (2006).

36. Organization of American States, Inter American
Corruption, March 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 624.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 731-32.
40. See id. at 732.
41.

Convention Against

See Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of International

Corrupt Payments: Cloningthe Foreign CorruptPracticesAct is not the Answer, 1 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 3 (1995) (explaining some of the short-comings of the FCPA and a
proposal for change).
42. See Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Anti-Bribery
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of which were Latin American nations.43 The Convention's agreement
adopts a multinational effort to provide mutual legal assistance among
adhering nations as well as making bribery an extraditable offense in
accordance with pre-existing treaties between the nations.44
III. Latin American Corruption
A.

Latin America's CorruptionPhenomenon

Spain provided Latin American states with much of their cultural,
social, and political heritage.45 Unfortunately, these states also inherited
a tradition of weak and corrupt governments.46 In the eighteenth century,
the Habsburgs passed down corruption to the Bourbons, who failed to
fundamentally alter or eradicate it. 47 Spanish power eventually collapsed
and colonial elites seized power between 1810 and 1822.48 To their
advantage, the colonial elites inherited49 "societies where public office
was widely regarded as an extension of private person."5 ° The wealthy
would often use resources at their disposal to establish relationships that
could transfer into political power.51
Under these conditions, corruption continually weakened respect for
the state while diffusing power, thereby retarding the process that liberal
reformers attempted to make. 52 "Although the Spanish crown had been
swept away, corruption remained [] an important device for distributing
power and resources in societies where family and personal ties
continued to overshadow the formal obligations which bind state and
citizen in a modem polity."53
Latin America's historical origins have a lot to do with the
patrimonial relationship it had with Spain.54 Through its patrimonial
relationship, Spain also passed down corruption as a sociocultural
phenomenon.55 This phenomenon is the "result of deeply seated patterns
Convention, 1997 S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43.
43. See id.
44. See id. arts. 9 & 10.
45. INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, supra note 5, at 61.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 60-61.
48. Id. at 61.

49. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES,

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 206.
THE WOODROW

supra note 5, at 61.

WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, COMBATING
CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA 4 (Joseph S. Tulchin & Ralph H. Espach eds., Woodrow

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:3

in a community's social and economic history. 56 Spain's "widely
disseminated practice linking patrimony and power ...is principally to
blame for the spread and the continuous renewal of what can be called
57
the culture of the appropriation of what is public by what is private.,
Corruption undoubtedly seems "arbitrary and as robbery to the cultured
middle class[, yet it] does not have the same connotation in the eyes of
the great masses of the poor, rural, and urban. 5 8 Usually the masses are
somehow completely involved in the politics of favors. 59 Thus, the
sociocultural phenomenon keeps perpetuating itself over time.
Attached to this perpetuating sociocultural phenomenon is
economic theory that bears on how the Latin American public views
corruption. "During boom times, when optimism reigns it is-whilst not
condoned-generally not condemned., 60 "When times become hard, the
public tends to look for scapegoats and often finds them from the boom
years. '' 6 1 This sociocultural apathy coupled with the historical origins of
Latin America has resulted in a culture of perpetual corruption. "The
movement of private money into politicians' pockets by means of the
public offices they occupy is combined with the inverse movement of
politicians' private money to benefit the private interests of the electors,
precisely as a reward for their political loyalty. 62 As wealth moves
through public offices, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish
63
what portions of the comingled funds are public and which are private.
The inherently difficult process of identifying money that has entered
corrupt channels 64 and the apathetic nature of the Latin American
public 65 assist in the perpetuation of a corrupt culture.
B.

Perceived Corruption

The international perception of corruption in a country can be an
indicator of the level at which such activity is pervasive within the
particular nation. 66 It would serve as economic diatribe to posit that
Wilson Center Press 2000) (2000).
56. Id.
57.

INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, supra note 5,

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 206.

INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, supranote 5, at 195.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 4.
66. See Transparency Int'l, Corruption Still Rampant in 70 Countries says
Corruption Perceptions Index
2005, (Oct.
18,
2005),
available at
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi/2005/media-pack.

62.
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bribery and corruption lead to the inefficient allocation of funds,
investments, and job opportunities, thereby decreasing economic morale
and security in the various markets of a nation. Nevertheless, the
international perception of corruption is a very important issue in our
economically interdependent world. Transparency International is a civil
society organization that focuses its effort on fighting corruption.6 7 In
2005, Transparency International commissioned Professor J. Graf
Lambsdorff of the University of Passau in Germany to produce a table
containing the Corruption Perceptions Index ("CPI") for that year.68
The study reported on 159 countries, twenty of which can be
considered Latin American. 69 The scores in Lambsdorff's study were
based on a zero to ten scale: the lowest scores were attributed to a
country perceived to be corrupt, while the higher scores proposed to
correspond to a highly uncorrupt country.70 "The CPI score relates to the
perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and
country analysts., 71 Of the twenty Latin American countries surveyed,
only one, Chile, achieved a score higher than six. 72 Although not
conclusive, the data provided by Transparency International tends to
place Latin American countries toward the lower end of its index.73
C. Actual Corruption
Even though accusations and perceptions of corruption are valuable
for identifying the actual business practices of certain corporations and
individuals, the best indicators of actual business practices are
established by analyzing the charges that have been filed or the penalties
imposed for FCPA violations. Subsequently, an examination is in order
regarding corruption in Latin America.
On November 17, 1982, International Harvester Company, the thendominant worldwide supplier of turbine compressor equipment 74 used to
capture high volumes of natural gas and subsequently deliver the gas to
processing plants, "entered a guilty plea to a one count bill of

67. See id. Transparency International was founded in 1993 and has several
publications that include an annual Global Corruption Report.
68. See id. Previous CPI data also available, Michael J. Hershman, U.S. Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct (FCPA): Watergate and Corporate "Slush" Funds, 1367 PLI/Corp
145, 235-52 (2003). Id.
69. Transparency Int'l, supra note 66. Total number of countries includes Latin
American countries in the Caribbean.
70. See id.
71. See id. (contained within the explanatory notes).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See United States v. Mclean, 738 F.2d 655, 656-57 (5th Cir. 1984).
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information charging conspiracy to violate the FCPA. ' 75 International
Harvester essentially pled guilty to bribing Mexican officials who
worked for Petroleos Mexicanos, Mexico's national petroleum company,
in an effort to gain a business advantage while supplying Petroleos
Mexicanos with necessary turbine compressor equipment.76
Corruption in the energy sector is well-known and documented,
including oil-for-food programs in the Middle East and activities by
OPEC members,77 Latin American ventures into agricultural corruption
is as well.78 In 1990, Billy Lamb and Carmon Willis sued Phillip Morris,
79
Inc. alleging violations of the FCPA and other federal antitrust laws.
The plaintiffs were growers and producers of "burley tobacco for use in
cigarettes and other tobacco products." 80 On May 14, 1982, a Phillip
Morris subsidiary contracted with La Fundacion Del Nifio of
Venezuela. 81 La Fundacion Del Nifio's president at the time was the
wife of the then-President of Venezuela. 82 The agreement called for two
subsidiaries of Phillip Morris to make donations to La Fundacion Del
Nifio in amounts totaling $12.5 million. 83 In return, the subsidiaries
would be granted the power to control the price of Venezuelan tobacco
as well as the ability to eliminate controls on retail cigarette prices in
Venezuela.8 4 Nevertheless, corruption in Latin America is not limited to
the agricultural sector.
After an investigation, the SEC filed a settled cease and desist
proceeding against International Business Machines Corporation
("IBM") in 2000.85 Without an admission or denial of guilt, the SEC
found that IBM had violated the FCPA and imposed a $300,000
penalty. 86 According to the enforcement proceedings, IBM-Argentina, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of IBM, paid approximately $22 million, of
which at least $4.5 million was transferred to several bank directors in an
75. Id.
76. Id. at 656. Holding for Defendant Mclean, the court concluded that "the FCPA
prohibits the prosecution of an employee for a substantive offense under the Act if his
employer has not and cannot be convicted of similarly violating the FCPA." Id.
77. See Warren Hoge, Annan Failed to Curb Corruption in Iraq's Oil-for-Food
Program, Investigators Report, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A6.
78. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1025 (6th Cir. 1990).
79. See id. Upholding the plaintiffs antitrust claims but striking down their FCPA
claim finding that there is no private right of action under the act.
80. Id. at 1025.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Lamb, 915 F.2dat 1025.
84. See id. at 1024.
85. International Business Machines Corp., S.E.C. Enforcement Proceedings, 2000
WL 1868634 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3443761.htm.
86. Id.
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attempt to secure a $250 million dollar contract to integrate and
modernize the computer system of a commercial bank owned by the
Argentine government.87 With the advent of multinational corporations
and the increasing value of government contracts at stake, corporations
worldwide are all vying for very lucrative business deals. 88 Corporations
focused on the bottom line often find it hard to resist temptation, yet the
potential capital loss from an FCPA conviction can be far more dramatic.
As Latin America modernizes, the technology sector has seen various
corrupt practices on the part of multinational American corporations.
In 2002, the SEC settled a case against BellSouth Corporation after
it was discovered that BellSouth violated certain provisions of the
FCPA. 89 BellSouth never admitted or denied the SEC's findings for the
order or the civil suit filed in federal court. 90 Nevertheless, the court
imposed a $150,000 civil judgment against BellSouth. 91 The findings
included violations of the FCPA in two Latin American countries. 92 The
SEC found that "between September 1997 and August 2000, former
senior management of BellSouth's Venezuelan subsidiary authorized
payments totaling approximately $10.8 million., 93
Furthermore,
between 1998 and 1999, BellSouth's Nicaraguan subsidiary made
payments amounting to sixty thousand dollars to the wife of a
Nicaraguan legislator who soon thereafter spearheaded the repeal of a
law restricting foreign ownership of Nicaraguan telecommunications
companies. 94 In addition, BellSouth was then able to gain a business
advantage by owning
eighty-nine percent of the telecommunications
95
market in Nicaragua.
In 2002, the SEC also found that Syncor International Corporation,
a provider of radiopharmaceutical products and services in the United
States and eighteen foreign countries, violated the FCPA by making at
least $600,000 in illicit payments to doctors employed by hospitals
controlled by foreign authorities.96 According to the SEC's findings,
87. See id.
88. See Paul Lewis, A World Fed Up With Bribes; Nations Begin Following U.S.
Curb on Corruption, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1996, at 1. Stating that foreign direct
investment in emerging economies, increased to $167 billion in 1996 from $44 billion in
1990.
89. See BellSouth Corp., S.E.C. Enforcement Proceeding, 2002 WL 49837 (Jan. 15,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-45279.htm.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. (countries included, Venezuela where payments totaling about $10.8
million were made and Nicaragua where $60,000 were paid to the wife of a legislator).
93. See id.
94. See BellSouth Corp., supranote 89.
95. See id.
96. See Syncor International Corp., Administrative Proceeding, 2002 WL 31757634
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"these illicit payments were made with the purpose and effect of
influencing the doctors' decisions so that Syncor could obtain or retain
business with them and the hospitals that employed them., 97 "During the
years 2000 through 2002, Syncor de Mexico [a subsidiary of Syncor
International Corporation] made a total of at least $200,000 in...
payments." 98 The SEC filed a civil suit that required Syncor to pay
$500,000 as a penalty. 99
Agents and employees of a corporation that are willfully involved in
an FCPA violation can also be fined and imprisoned because of their
status as "domestic concerns." 100 Robert King was one of the largest
investors in Owl Securities and Investments, Ltd. while the FBI was
investigating the group.'l l The FBI's taped conversations of King
exposed "dealings between certain individuals who hoped to develop a
port in Limon, Costa Rica." 10 2 Although King's initial dealings were not
a violation of the FCPA, the court found that "the planned payment of a
$1 million bribe to senior Costa Rican officials and political parties to
obtain concessions for the land on which the new development was to be
built"10 3 were clear violations. 10 4 Subsequently, the court sentenced King
to thirty months imprisonment and fined him sixty thousand dollars.10 5
IV. Corporate Compliance Programs
A.

Elements of a Good Compliance Program

It is essential for multinational corporations to have effective
compliance programs, both nationally and internationally, if they are to
save themselves from future financial hardship, potential imprisonment
of its corporate agents, and public embarrassment. Perceived and actual
corporate corruption have been public relations nightmares for some
corporations in the past decade. 10 6 As a result, many corporations have
tried to prevent corrupt actions by implementing ethical and moral

(Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46979.htm.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See SEC v. Syncor International Corp., No. 1:02CV02421 (D.D.C.), Lit. Rel.
No. 17887 (Dec. 10, 2002).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A) (2000).
101. See United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2004).
102. Id. (affirming the lower court's finding that there was sufficient evidence to
support the conviction).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See Lewis, supra note 88.
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standards throughout all business practices. 0 7 Nevertheless, not all
corporations have initiated those corporate policies because of altruistic
goals. "Congress and the [SEC] have imposed a variety of reforms, most
notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and regulations issued under the Act, to
ensure that
corporations improve their corporate governance
0
practices." 8
Corporations that wish to implement compliance programs can

follow certain steps outlined by the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.' 0 9 However, courts have suggested that these guidelines may
not be determinative of a corporation's compliance with the FCPA and
various other regulations." 0 A corporation "shall exercise due diligence
to prevent and detect criminal conduct and otherwise promote an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment
to compliance with the law.""'
Furthermore, the program must be
"reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced" ' 1 2 so as to achieve the
ultimate goal of compliance while "preventing and detecting criminal
conduct."' 1 3 Nevertheless, a failure to "prevent or detect" ' 1 4 a crime is
not determinative of the program's effectiveness." 5 Aside from meeting
those two requirements, the United States Sentencing Guidelines set out
seven requirements that compliance programs must
meet regarding due
16
diligence and the promotion of ethical conduct."
First, a corporation must establish standards and procedures to
prevent and detect criminal conduct. 1 7 The establishment of8 such
standards and procedures can be tough and very time consuming. 1
Second, the guidelines require that a corporation's governing
authority be knowledgeable about the content and operation of the
compliance program while exercising reasonable oversight with respect
to the implementation and effectiveness of the program."l 9 Presumably,
107. See Part V, for a discussion on "Corporation X's" hardships.
108. Hughes, supra note 35.
109. See generally United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1, pts. a, b,
and c (2004).
110. See In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970
(Del. Ch. 1996); see also Dan K. Webb, Robert W. Tarun & Steven F. Molo, Corporate
Internal Investigations, CORPII App. K, pt. 7 (2006) ("no compliance program can ever
prevent all criminal activity.") Id.
111. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. a(1), (2).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at

pt. a(1)-(7).
117.

Seeid. atpt.b(1).

118. See pt. V, for a discussion on "Corporation X's" hardships.
119.

See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. b(2)(a).

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:3

those administering and promoting the program should have intimate
knowledge of its content and purpose as well as the ability to exercise
some control over it. 120 Moreover, high-level personnel should be
assigned overall responsibility for the compliance program. 12 1 In
addition, specific individuals, not the high-level personnel, shall be given
the reins to run the day-to-day operations of the program as well as
adequate resources and appropriate authority. 122
These individuals
123
should report periodically to high-level personnel.
Third, a corporation must ensure, through due diligence, "not to
include within the substantial authority personnel of the organization any
individual who[] ... has engaged in illegal activities or other125conduct
inconsistent with"' 124 the ultimate goal of a compliance program.
Fourth, a corporation must use reasonable efforts to communicate
the requirements of the program by way of training 126 and other forms of
disseminating internal information to various individuals including:
members of the governing authority, high-level personnel, substantial
authority personnel, the organization's
employees, and, where
127
agents.
organization's
the
appropriate,
Fifth, a corporation must reasonably ensure compliance with the
program through monitoring and auditing in an effort to discover
criminal conduct. 128 To further the legitimate ends of the compliance
program, corporations must periodically evaluate the effectiveness of
their respective program. 129 In addition, if the program is to be
successful, the corporation must have a system in place where
"employees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential
or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation."' 130
This
requirement is extremely important. If a compliance program is to work
as designed, employees must not fear retaliation for reporting potential
criminal conduct, while being cognizant
that their complaint will be
31
1
investigated.
be
and
seriously
taken
Sixth, to be effective, a compliance program must be promoted and
120. See id. at pt. b(2)(c).
121. See id. at pt. b(2)(b).
122. See id. at pt. b(2)(c).
123. Id.
124. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. b(3).
125. Id.
126. See pt. V, for a discussion on "Corporation X's" hardships.
127. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. b(4)(a), (b).
128. See id. at pt. b(5)(a). Also see pt. V, for a discussion on "Corporation X's"
hardships.
129. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supranote 109, at pt. b(5)(b).
130. Id. at pt. b(5)(c). Also see pt. V, for a discussion on "Corporation X's"
hardships.
131. See pt. V, for a discussion on "Corporation X's" hardships.
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enforced consistently while providing incentives for adhering to the
program and punishing criminal conduct for failure to prevent or detect
such conduct. 13 2 Incentives play an important role in compliance
programs and must make employees feel like adhering to the program is
part of their job description. 33 Furthermore, the employees that fail to
comply with the program must be reprimanded as an example to others,
showing that such behavior will not be accepted because it is harmful to
the corporation's goals. 134 If designed effectively, a good compliance
program will provide incentives and reinforcement for employees who
actively engage in the program
as well as those who bring possible
35
violations to the forefront.1
Seventh, if and when criminal conduct is discovered, a corporation
must reasonably respond to such conduct while attempting to prevent
similar acts from occurring in the future. 136 A reasonable response may
include making modifications to the compliance program. 137 If a
compliance program is to be truly effective, constant monitoring must be
a priority for both high-level personnel in charge of the program
and
138
subordinates in charge of the program's day-to-day operations.
A corporation must periodically evaluate any potential for conduct
that violates the compliance program and subsequently make changes to
the program that are likely to reduce the potential for such conduct in the
future. 139 As time passes, a corporation is likely to diversify its business
ventures, and as such, a responsible compliance program will meet the
needs of a corporation's changing dynamic, thereby reducing the risk of
criminal conduct that had been previously identified.
B.

Positive and Negative Effects of a Compliance Program

A good compliance program requires a large level of commitment if
it is to achieve its ultimate goal. 140 This level of commitment includes:
constant revisions, 14 ' audits of the program's ability to appropriately
identify criminal activity, 42 dissemination of information regarding goals
132.

See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. b(6)(a),

(b).
133. See pt. V, for a discussion on "Corporation X's" hardships.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. b(7).
137. See id.
138. See id. at pt. b(2)(c).
139. See id. at pt. c.
140. Id. at pt. a(1), (2).
141. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. b(5)(a), b(7).
See also pt. V, for a discussion of "Corporation X's" hardships.
142. See id. at pt. a(1)-(7).
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and expectations to all employees, 14 3 establishing that corporate morality
and ethics are expected from all,' 44 and actively engaging in investigation
and reporting of possible criminal activity.1 45
Nevertheless, a
corporation that takes all the reasonably prudent steps to prevent a
compliance violation may fall short.
A corporation that establishes a compliance program, but does not
have an appropriate means of achieving a legitimate end, is worse off
than a corporation that has no established program. 46 Both plaintiffs and
prosecutors in civil or criminal cases can use compliance manuals to
demonstrate actions the company should have exercised consistent with
its own protocol. 147 Thereafter, the ultimate issue to be resolved at trial
is whether the company actually complied with its own policies and
procedures. 48 Faced with its own procedures in writing, a corporation
would be hard pressed to identify reasons why they were not followed. ,
The United States Sentencing Guidelines have been extended to
civil cases arising under the FCPA.149 In United States v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 5 ° the Massachusetts District Court "settled a civil FCPA case
requiring the imposition of a compliance program drawn directly from
the guidelines."' 5' In its order of final judgment against Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., the court also imposed a $400,000 fine. 52
If illegal activity occurs and the corporation in question "had in
place at the time of the offense an effective compliance and ethics
program[]' 53 such program will reduce the corporation's culpability. 54
However, a reduction in the corporation's culpability will be negated if,
after "becoming aware of an offense, the organization unreasonably
delayed reporting the offense."' 155 A reduction in culpability is also
negated if high-level personnel of the corporation' 56"participated in,
condoned, or [were] willfully ignorant of the offense."'
According to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, "there is a
143. See id. at pt. b(4)(a), (b).
144. See id. at pt. b(6)(a), (b).
145. Id. at pt. a(1), (2).
146. See Hughes, supra note 35.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. United States v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., No. 99CV-12566-NG, 1, 3, Consent and
Undertaking (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 1999), reprinted in Business Laws, Inc. (FCPA) at
§ 699.749. (unreported).
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, pt. f(l).
154. Id.
155. Id. at pt. f(2).
156. Id. at pt. f(3)(a).
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rebuttable presumption.., that [the] organization did not have an
effective compliance... program if' 157 the individual who "participated
in, condoned or was willfully ignorant of the offense was" 158 high-level
personnel or had substantial authority over the program. 159 Presumably,
the reduction in culpability for a corporation is negated if any of the
individuals involved in the illegal activity were high-ranking personnel
within the corporation.
However, if the corporation, within a reasonable time after
becoming aware of an offense and "prior to an imminent threat of
disclosure or government investigation," 160 reports such offense to the
appropriate governmental authority, a reduction in culpability will be
assessed.161 To receive leniency, the corporation must fully cooperate
with any government investigation as well as demonstrate recognition
162
and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for the criminal conduct.
Although high-level participation in illegal activity can prevent a
reduction in culpability, an effective compliance program can also shield
these same individuals from the criminal acts of other corporate
employees. 163 In re CaremarkInternationalInc.,' 64 though not related to
the FCPA, provides a good example of how an effective compliance
program can shield individuals from personal liability. 165 According to
the indictment issued in 1994 by a grand jury in Minnesota, Caremark
International, Inc. had paid over $1.1 million for the distribution of a
drug it marketed. 166
The court stated, "no rationally designed
information and reporting system will remove the possibility that the
corporation will violate laws or regulations, or that senior officers or
directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or otherwise fail
reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation's compliance with
the law."'167 Moreover, the court stressed that high-level corporate
employees must exercise good faith in the operation of a compliance
program so that information regarding
violations of law will come to
68
their attention in a timely manner.'

157. Id. at pt. f(3)(b).
158. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 109, at pt. f(3)(b).
159. Id.
160. Id. at pt. g(1).
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Hughes, supra note 35, at § 1:12.
164. See In re Caremark International, 698 A.2d 959 (approving the settlement
agreement for $250 million while finding no liability on the part of the directors).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 963-64.
167. Id. at 970.
168. In re CaremarkInternational,supra note 164, 963-64.
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ProsecutorialAreas of Interest

Aside from having effective compliance programs in place, it is
important for corporations to be aware of the factors that prosecutors
take into consideration when deciding whether to charge a particular
corporation. A December 12, 2006 memorandum from the Deputy
Attorney General to United States Attorneys ("McNulty Memorandum")
stated succinctly that "[t]he prosecution of corporate crime is a high
priority for the Department of Justice." 169 Moreover, Mcnulty posited
that every Department of Justice investigation would inevitably
protect
70
investors and ensure public confidence in corporations. 1
In general, "[c]orporations should not be treated leniently because
of their artificial nature nor should they be subject to harsher
treatment."' 71 In addition, charging a corporation is likely to elicit
immediate remedial steps within that particular corporation as well as
having an effect throughout the particular industry.1 72 In addition, the
charge may assist in changing corporate culture as well as the behavior
of the employees of a particular corporation.1 73 Thereafter, the McNulty
Memorandum set out various 174
factors that prosecutors should look toward
corporation.
a
when charging
Prosecutors are to look at a variety of factors that may shed light on
the corporation's proclivity toward criminal activity or inaction to known
activity.1 75 The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within a corporation can be
established if a large number of employees from a particular department
are engaged in misconduct or if upper management condoned the
action. 76 In addition, "[p]rosecutors may consider a corporation's
history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory
enforcement actions against it, in determining to bring criminal
charges."'177 "A history of similar conduct may be probative of a
corporate culture that encouraged, or at least condoned, such conduct,
regardless of compliance programs.'1 78 Therefore, corporations that
have previously been involved in any action regarding corporate
misconduct should be as proactive as possible in ensuring that they do
169. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf
[hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
170. Id. at 1.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 4-5.
175. Id. at 4.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 6.
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not succumb to the same or similar fate as before.
The McNulty Memorandum also encourages corporate compliance
programs due to their "self-policing" nature that includes voluntary
disclosures of any activity the corporation discovers on its own.179
"However, the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in
and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal conduct
undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents." 180 Although
a compliance program may help reduce a corporation's culpability,' 8 1 it
will not completely shield it from criminal charges. 182 If a corporation
has a compliance program and an FCPA violation occurs, the violation
1 83
may be indicative that the program is not being adequately enforced.
The McNulty Memorandum further recognizes that:
[N]o compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity...
critical factors.., are whether the program is adequately designed
for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing
by employees and whether corporate management is enforcing the
program or is tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to engage
in misconduct to achieve business objectives. 184
A corporation's ready willingness to make restitution for any illegal
action also holds weight, though payment of a fine is not a substitute for
potential charges.1 85 Furthermore, prosecutors should consider "remedial
actions[] such as implementing an effective corporate compliance
program, improving an existing compliance program, and disciplining
wrongdoers." ' 86 Even though a compliance program will not be
completely determinative of the potential liability of a corporation, it
seems clear that a compliance program will be given serious
consideration in determining potential charges, corporate liability, and
fines. These factors seem inextricably intertwined, and when coupled
with recent corporate scandals, cement the need for an effective
compliance program within all multinational corporations.
Finally, "[i]n negotiating plea agreements with corporations,
179. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 12.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 13.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 12-13. See also pt. IV, § B, for a discussion of the rebuttable presumption
that leniency should be negated if the individuals involved in the criminal activity
"participated in, condoned, or [were] willfully ignorant of the offense" while serving in
their capacities as high-level officials or individuals in control of the compliance
program.
184. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 14. See also pt. IV, § A, for a
discussion of the various elements of a good compliance program.
185. Id. at 15.

186. Id.
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prosecutors should seek a plea to the most serious, readily provable
offense charged."' 187 Subsequently, corporations should not expect to
plea down any charges while remaining cognizant that they will be
charged with the highest crime for which evidence exists. "In addition,
the terms of the plea agreement should contain appropriate provisions to
ensure punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and compliance with the
plea agreement in the corporate context." 88 The terms of the plea
agreement may also include judicial oversight.' 89 It would seem that an
effective compliance program is integral to any corporation if it wishes
to comply with the FCPA or various other laws and if a company wants
to diminish its vulnerability So fines and sanctions while protecting its
high-level and management personnel.
V.

Multinational "Corporation X"'

90

Intellectual conjecture, economic theory, and historical analysis
provide insight into Latin American corruption. The laws of the United
States, legislative comments, and notes provide a framework for
corporations to follow in establishing compliance programs to combat
corruption. Nevertheless, it is helpful to put all these theories and
conjecture into perspective, as viewed and experienced by a large
multinational corporation with operations in Latin America.
Many individuals have varying views as to the overall effect of the
FCPA, nevertheless countries worldwide have chosen to adopt
legislation outlawing bribery. 19 1 The United States' adoption of the
FCPA was a good idea but it contains many imperfections. 92 However,
without the FCPA, corruption would be more pervasive amongst
corporations; therefore, it is good to see that the United States has taken a
stance. 193 Unfortunately, the fashion in which the FCPA was drafted has
created a lot of problems. 94 Having some accountability is great and
truly needed, but demanding one hundred percent accountability is

187.

Id. at 18.

188.

Id.

189. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 19.
190. The name of the corporation will not be given in an effort to protect and
maintain its right to privacy. Furthermore, in an effort to protect the rights of the two
individuals who agreed to be interviewed, their names will also be withheld.
191. See pt. II, § B, for a discussion of the international efforts towards combating
corruption.
192. Interview with "Individual B," Senior Counsel of the International Division
responsible for Latin America & Canada, Corporation X, in City Y, State Z (Jan. 3, 2007)
[hereinafter Interview with Individual B]. See also Muffler, supra note 41, at 3.
193. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192.
194. See id.
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improbable and changes the original mission of the FCPA. 195 It is also
important to remember that the FCPA deals in very fine gradations of
intent. 196 The FCPA fails to draw a bright line within the text or
legislative history that would put an individual on notice that the activity
they are engaging
in is a violation of the statute. 197 It is essentially an
198
intent issue.
A.

Interview with IndividualA

As previously discussed, the perception of a state can often be
indicative of the actual corruption occurring in a particular state. Which
Latin American state is perceived as being the most corrupt in the eyes of
a Vice President and Senior Counsel at a large multinational corporation?
According to one, corruption is a direct function of the role of the state in
the economy. 199 It is of no consequence that the government is labeled as
right-wing or left-wing politically. 200 This is evidenced by states like
Ecuador and Peru who have traditionally had military authoritarian
regimes, as juxtaposed with Chile, which has had a more truly liberalized
economy and thus is less likely to be corrupt.20 1
Nevertheless, looking at a state's central government may not be

completely determinative, it is also important to look at a particular
state's disseminated power structure.20 2 One example is Argentina, a
country that is highly federalized and rarely has problems in the capital
city of Buenos Aires.20 3 However, the same is not true of provincial
governments and provincial regulators.20 4 The same issues abound in
Brazil, as its provincial structures are also subject to corruption. 0 5
In response to an outbreak of corruption amongst corporations,
Corporation X concluded that it needed a global compliance program
beginning with education. 206 In an effort to implement its plan,
Corporation X worked with outside counsel to formulate a corporate

195. See id.
196. Interview with "Individual A," Vice President & Senior Counsel, Corporation X,
in City Y, State Z (Jan. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Interview with Individual A].
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. See pt. III, § A, for a discussion of the international efforts towards
combating corruption ("Usually the masses are somehow completely involved in the
politics of favors."). Id.
205. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
206. Id.
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policy statement and objectives that would express its position on
corruption and bribery.2 °7 The result was a twenty-page document
outlining the "dos and don'ts.,,20 8 Simultaneously, a compliance
department was assembled with the goal of educating employees as well
as preventing any potential corrupt activity. 0 9 Corporation X knew it
was important to track finances and how money was spent abroad; thus,
it has various departments that work with an outside firm in an effort to
follow money and see where certain expenditures are made.210 Constant
monitoring occurs and is subsequently followed by an internal audit.2 1
The audits proceed as a regular matter, with those countries at the lower
end of the Transparency International list usually receiving more
attention. 212
An effective compliance program and routine audits are not
sufficient to combat corruption.213 A compliance program requires a lot
of resources and the company must stand behind it.2 14 A corporate
commitment of resources is the most important aspect of a compliance
program, if it is to be truly effective.21 5 Individual A is a Senior
Executive at the company and has spent at least forty percent of the last
two years working on FCPA matters and compliance in general.216
Part of the inherent problem with compliance is that corporations
have increasingly become multinational, making inspection and
monitoring more difficult.21 7 The head of Latin American operations for
Corporation X is in the United States but travels to Latin America often
in an effort to monitor compliance. 2 18 High-level personnel within the
21 9
compliance program are primarily located in the United States.
Nevertheless, there is a need for individuals on the ground in particular
countries. However, clients feel most comfortable when their high-level
legal personnel are primarily located in their place of business or
headquarters. 220 Therefore, every single executive in Latin America,
including managers and some low-level employees, have been trained in

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
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FCPA compliance. 221 The training is done in person when possible, over
222
Additionally, there is an online
the phone, or by video conference.
training manual available in at least twenty different languages.22 3
As outlined by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, if a
corporation is to have an effective compliance program it should make
reasonable efforts to communicate the requirements of the program with
its employees or agents.224 Corporation X has a training manual for
lawyers, finance personnel, executive management at the mid-director
level, and employees in the compliance department.225 Individual A has
conducted half of the trainings himself, while head lawyers for particular
divisions train individuals within their sectors.226 However, it is
somewhat impractical for a multinational corporation to do all of the
required training face to face; as such, other means are used. 227 For
individuals who cannot be trained in person, Corporation X uses video
and audio conferences to provide the same compliance information;
those trained via this method have been extremely receptive.228
Employees also take online quizzes regarding FCPA and other
compliance matters. 229 As a percentage of the industry, Corporation X
believes that it has reached a large number of people as compared to
other corporations.2 3 °
Once employees have been trained, it is important that there be a
To facilitate
conduit for reporting potential FCPA violations.231
can be
information
where
a
hotline
established
X
reporting, Corporation
232
Furthermore, all
received on an anonymous or identified basis.
individuals know specifically who they are supposed to report to if they
have a compliance issue.

233

If a corporation is to have an effective compliance program it must
also get employees involved in a corporate culture that does not tolerate
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See pt. IV, § A, for a discussion of the components of a good compliance
program, specifically factor four.
225. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
231. See pt. IV, § A, for a discussion of the components of a good compliance
program, specifically factor five.
232. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196. "However, there are some very
complicated issues that arise with regards to privacy laws in Europe, which makes
compliance somewhat tougher. The German government almost shut down the hotline
because it violated their privacy laws." Id.
233. Id.
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corruption.234
Corporation X uses performance evaluations to
accomplish this goal; the evaluations adjudge compliance, ethics, and
integrity. 235 The corporation first looks to see if the particular individual
has met their job objectives, then it evaluates how the particular
individual behaved in achieving those objectives.236 There are no
incentives for compliance but there are clear disincentives for noncompliance.237
Corporation X has a no-tolerance policy for non-compliance with
the FCPA, thus if someone violates the FCPA he or she is fired
automatically no matter what level he or she holds at the corporation.2 38
There are various types of behavior that may be questionable but not
necessarily illegal; these activities are covered in performance
evaluations.239 Corporation X has very little tolerance for anyone who
crosses the line, and therefore anyone who does is fired openly so that
other individuals in the company are aware of what was going on.240
However, a problem arises internationally with countries that have atatclrCroain
will employment. 241 In those particular
countries, Corporation X has tto
conduct an investigation before the statutorily-required time span under
local labor laws, making a public firing more difficult.242 In some
countries, a violation of United States law is not just cause for firing an
employee; in this situation, Corporation X usually pays the remuneration
required under local law and fires the individual.24 3
FCPA compliance can be very confusing for a corporation, but there
are several things that a corporation could do in an effort to comply.
First, Senior Management must show an open and constant commitment
to FCPA compliance. 24 Second, consistency is important, a corporation
cannot just binge on FCPA issues for two months or two years;
compliance must be incorporated into normal business practices.245
When done openly and constantly, it will serve to provide visibility to all
234. See pt. IV, § A, for a discussion of the components of a good compliance
program, specifically factor six.
235. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
236. Id.
237. Id. "While there are no incentives, unfavorable performance evaluations will
negatively affect the individual's bonus." Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. "It is also important to remember that the FCPA deals in very fine gradations
of intent." Id. See pt. V, for a discussion of the components of a good compliance
program, specifically factor six.
240. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
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employees regarding corporate expectations. 246 Third, a corporation
must be realistic.247 A corporation must take an honest inventory of the
business it is involved in and the particular risks that its industry is
susceptible to. 248 Fourth, a corporation cannot lie. 249 It can tell
employees to be culturally sensitive in their business dealings but still
require them to comply with the FCPA.25 ° Sometimes it might be hard to
attempt to change the culture where a person is conducting business; the
best advice
in that situation is to walk away from that particular business
251
venture.
As an example, Individual A explains how Corporation X has dealt
252
with Argentina, which he views as being exceedingly corrupt.
Historically, Argentina had a strangle hold on the economy, leaving
under-compensated individuals in the country to expect a pay off during
business dealings.253
In Argentina, problems have not occurred
specifically with government officials, but rather normal business
individuals who expect to receive financial compensation for
performance of their job duties.254 Within Latin America, bribery is
culturally accepted as perfectly normal behavior, even though it is known
to be wrong.255 Thus, Corporation X is at a competitive disadvantage
because local companies only need to worry about local corruption
legislation, which is rarely enforced.256
Nevertheless, Corporation X cannot operate under culturallyaccepted corrupt practices and has subsequently analyzed whether
Argentina is still a viable business option. 7 While the Argentine
population is somewhat rich, the business risk must be analyzed and a
determination reached.258 Corporation X explains to its local managers
that it is not trying to be culturally insensitive, but rather acting prudently
in the assessment of the potential legal and financial ramifications of
non-compliance with the FCPA 9

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
Id.
Id.

253. Id.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Interview with Individual A, supra note 196.
Id.

257.

Id.

258.
259.

Id.
Id.
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Interview with Individual B

Individual B works specifically in the Latin American division of
Corporation X and thus has a unique view with respect to perceived and
actual corruption in the region. When asked which Latin American
country is most susceptible to corruption, he quickly quipped:
Argentina. 260 However, Ecuador, though not necessarily corrupt, has a
terrible legal system making enforcement of rights nearly impossible.2 6'
The inadequacy of the Ecuadorian legal system is most notably
exemplified by its decision to go on strike for about three months. 62
Furthermore, Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico raise various issues due to
their thin social fabric.263
The lack of judicial enforcement in certain areas has led to corrupt
legislation that is useless.2 4 In turn, multinational corporations that are
not based in the United States have a competitive advantage.265 Often
multinational corporations that are not based in the United States deal
directly with prosecutors in the particular country, making corrupt
practices more practical, whereas multinational corporations based in the
United States must go through United States prosecutors who often do
not understand what is going on in these international jurisdictions.266
Sometimes the problem is further exacerbated because competitors in the
foreign country are also government officials, which prohibits any type
of reasonable competition if a corporation wants to comply with the
FCPA.267 Thus, Corporation X has had to limit various aspects of
industry where it cannot compete as well as cease business relationships
with individuals who might place them in a risky situation.2 68
Corporation X has had to change its business models because it cannot
compete without making bribes or political contributions.2 69
In an effort to proactively prevent any situation that might lead to an
FCPA violation, Corporation X is involved in extensive compliance

260. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192. The statements by both
interviewees correspond with Argentina's CPI ranking, which places them in the lower
half. See generally Transparency Int'l, supra note 66.
261. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
"Moreover, U.S. based
266. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192.
multinational corporations face complicated discovery issues under U.S. legislation that
are not relevant under foreign legislation." Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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training.270 Nevertheless, it faces severe problems, particularly because
the FCPA is comprised of complex provisions that are often difficult for
individuals to explain or understand.27 1 Corporation X breaks down
training into two distinct parts.272 The first is legal training, which
involves many legal nuances and often does not have a lasting effect on
7 The second type of training
trainees. 273
is less formal in substance and
consists of past experiences and lessons learned.274 During training,
employees must learn that the Latin American elites are so well
connected that it is hard to find business individuals who have no
conflicts of interest.2 75 Thus, employees must be cognizant of this fact
and simultaneously navigate local laws to determine who might be
considered a government official.276
However, these two types of training are not enough.2 77 Warnings
to employees are not enough; nevertheless, it does not seem
economically feasible to go into a Latin American country to train all
low-level employees in person.278 While a corporation could easily
document on paper that training has occurred, in actuality attaining the
training required by law is nearly impossible. 279 Aside from a logistical
nightmare, the FCPA requirements raise some serious linguistic and
cultural issues. 280
There is no equivalent for the English word
"compliance" in Spanish, French, or Portuguese; 281 in actuality, the word
has other meanings in various countries.282 The FCPA raises many
translation issues for words and ideas that do not exist in Latin American
283
countries.
Training in FCPA compliance coupled with a violation may still be
insufficient grounds to fire an employee. As previously discussed,
country-specific employment law might be a bar toward rapid, efficient,
and public firings.284 Corporation X runs the risk of being sued for libel,
270. Id.
271. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. See pt. III, § A, for a discussion of the corrupt elitist system Latin America
inherited from Spain.
276. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192.
282. Id.
283. Id. Regardless of the translation issue, all Latin American employees receive a
compliance manual, which lays out all of the FCPA requirements translated in Spanish.
Moreover, all employees must certify that they have received a compliance manual. Id.
284. Id. See also pt. V, § A, for a discussion of the complicated nature of at-will
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a serious crime in Latin American countries where reputation and social
status is highly valued, if it punishes an employee publicly and does not
have adequate legal proof that stands up in court.2 85 Latin American
jurisprudence does not place a large value on oral testimony, in
comparison with the United States.286 It is almost a requirement that the
employer have some hard evidence to prove just cause for firing an
individual.2 8' This is often very difficult because corruption usually
occurs under covert circumstances involving cash payments.28 8 One
example of sufficient evidence would be a notarized videotape depicting
the corruption. 289 Corporation X could subsequently fire an employee
publicly on the basis of lack of honor or moral turpitude.29 °
Nevertheless, if an individual is fired without a public ouster of corrupt
activities, other employees may be aware of their bad reputation and are
likely to draw inferences regarding the real reason for the firing.29'
A corporation seeking to implement a compliance program must
keep all of the aforementioned problems in mind if it is to be successful
in complying with the FCPA.
True compliance requires that a
corporation implement the proper form of the program.29 2 However,
form is not sufficient, as substance is what will truly make a compliance
program effective. 293 A corporation could easily provide evidence in the
form of slides or documentation of FCPA training if they were under a
government investigation.294 Nevertheless, the substance of the program
is more important because it is responsible for how individuals learn
what is appropriate or inappropriate.2 95 Moreover, corporations must be
cognizant of the particular problems that its employees are facing. 96
Corporations that have not been diligent in identifying these recurring
problems are likely to find that employees have resolved the problems in
an illegal manner.297 As such, a corporation should identify particular
problems and provide its employees with solutions that are compliant
with United States law.298 However, the FCPA does not distinguish
employment in Latin America.
285. Interview with Individual B, supra note 192.
286. Id.
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where a particular violation may occur, leaving a corporation with a
logistical training nightmare if it is truly multinational.299
A corporation should also conduct a risk-management study that is
tailored to capture potential FCPA violations. 300 Corporations must also
be cognizant of the fact that the FCPA is written to capture everything,
and as such, the risk-management study should focus on particular risks
that are prevalent in the particular industry and country it is involved
in. 30 1 After conducting the study, the corporation should reevaluate any
new risks or gaps that surfaced.30 2 The corporation would be best
protected by conducting a "lessons learned" process, where further study
into the corporate culture and the particular industry are conducted.30 3
The results of conducting these studies may not necessarily be positive,
thereby leading a corporation to the conclusion that it is impossible to
operate ethically in a particular region.30 4 Corporation X has been faced
with the same problem and has chosen to withdraw
from any ongoing
30 5
business operations in the particular country.
However, a corporation should be mindful if its study reveals that a
business division in a particular country is working smoothly and reveals
no problems.30 6 If this situation occurs, the corporation should conduct
an immediate audit of the reporting system, as it is likely that there is
something wrong.30 7 Furthermore, new and revised training may be
appropriate because some of the employees clearly do not have a full
appreciation of the law. 30 8 Nevertheless, a corporation should be mindful
of the message it sends.30 9 If the corporation sends a message that a
compliance failure is unacceptable, then employees are likely to hide
certain information out of fear. 31° Thus, the corporation should have
thorough conversations with its employees regarding failure, while
simultaneously establishing reasonable alternatives. 311 A corporation
must understand that compliance is not merely about encouraging
employees to behave morally, but rather understanding the underlying
factors which lead an employee to justify corruption or bribery when
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making a business decision.3 12
VI. Moving Forward While Learning From The Past: Lessons Learned
Latin America's proclivity toward corruption can be gleaned from
its historical origins and its general inability to overcome deeply rooted
societal and political problems.313 While corruption is understood as
being wrong and immoral,314 a system of social connections and political
friendships undermines any effort toward a transparent government.31 5
Subsequently, any multinational corporation would be wise to actively
and tacitly promote an effective compliance program.31 6
Any corporation that is not seriously considering potential risk
management issues in Latin America should be mindful of the many
SEC sanctions that have been levied against various corporations.317
Moreover, the fervor with which the McNulty Memorandum charges
government prosecutors should serve as a sufficient deterrent, if not an
adequate motivator.31 8 For corporations that heed the obvious warning
signs, an effective compliance program can serve as a good foundation
and be further solidified through constant monitoring.
A corporation should establish, at minimum, a compliance program
that outlines standards and procedures to assist in the detection of
criminal conduct.3 19 Once established, a corporation's governing
authority should be intimately attuned with the general workings and
overall goals of the compliance program.32 ° Subsequent to compliance
familiarization, those in charge of the compliance program should make
reasonable, if not zealous, efforts to communicate the new standards to
employees.32'
In an effort to follow up with newly instituted standards and
procedures, the corporation should set up a monitoring and auditing
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system.
Nevertheless, monitoring needs to be coupled with consistent
enforcement and punishment for employees who fail to comply with the
program."' If a corporation discovers criminal conduct, it should
reasonably respond while simultaneously updating the compliance
program to prevent future violations.324
Corporations, individual employees, and agents should remember
the steep fines imposed under the FCPA.32 5 Individuals are subject to a
maximum fine of five million dollars or imprisonment of up to twenty
years or both.326 Moreover, the corporation involved could be charged a
million dollars, though there is no potential
maximum fine of twenty-five
327
for imprisonment.
The corporation should be mindful of the fine gradations that the
FCPA imposes, 328 remembering that the use of "any instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of anything of value to,, 32 9 any foreign
government official may be considered a violation of the FCPA. As a
crime of intent, any offer or promise to pay may constitute a violation.33 °
Thus, a compliance program that is not enforced may never effectively
prevent SEC sanctions.33 1
If a corporation is to avoid the old idiom of being "penny wise and
pound foolish," a front-loaded investment in a detailed compliance
program is the most prudent way of preventing future financial loss and
embarrassment. Nevertheless, form must be supported by effective
monitoring and evaluation in order to maintain the substance required for
a truly effective compliance program.
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